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INTRODUCTION
The Post Conviction Relief Act1 ("PCRA") provides a procedure for defendants to
collaterally challenge their conviction or sentence. It is the sole means2 of obtaining
collateral relief and has been broadly interpreted as creating a unified statutory
framework for reviewing claims that were traditionally cognizable in state habeas
corpus.3 The Act permits defendants in custody4 to seek relief when the conviction
or sentence results in one or more of the Act's enumerated errors or defects5 and
when the claimed error has not been waived 6 or previously litigated7 on direct ap-
peal or in a previous PCRA petition. Subject to several narrow exceptions, a petition
under the Act must be filed within one year of the date the defendant's judgment of
* Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University and the author
of the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Act-Practice & Procedure (2012 ed.).
1. 42 Pa.C.S. §9541 et seq.
2. 42 Pa.C.S. §9542.
3. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §6501 et seq.
4. 42 Pa.C.S. §9543(a)(1). The Act requires a defendant to be in custody"at the time relief is granted."
5. 42 Pa.C.S. §9543 (a)(2). To avoid a bifurcated system of post-conviction review, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has not limited the PCRA to its specifically enumerated areas of review. See e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Chester, 733 A.2d 1242 (Pa. 1999) (applying Act to claims arising during penalty phase of
a capital case); Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 736 A.2d 564 (Pa. 1999) (a claim that counsel failed to file direct
appeal cognizable under Act); Commonwealth v. Liebel, 825 A.2d 630 (Pa. 2003) (Act applies to claim that
counsel failed to file petition for allowance of appeal).
6. 42 Pa.C.S. §9543(a)(4), 9544(b).
7. 42 Pa.C.S. §9544(a).
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sentence becomes final.8 This article reports on a number of recent decisions of the
Pennsylvania Supreme and Superior Court construing provisions of the Act.
PRO SE CLAIMS OF APPELLATE COUNSEL INEFFECTIVENESS
In Commonwealth v. Jette9, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court limited defendants abil-
ity to challenge the effectiveness of appointed counsel.10 In Jette, the Court reviewed
a procedure adopted by the Superior Court to address pro se filings by defendants
represented on appeal alleging the ineffectiveness of appellate counsel. Following
the denial of PCRA relief, Jette's appellate counsel filed a brief in the Superior Court
asserting that the PCRZA court erred with respect to its
Requiring appel- resolution of one of five claims of trial counsel ineffec-
lant counsel to tiveness presented to the PCRA court. Jette then filed a
pro se petition for remand claiming appellate counsel
petition for remand was ineffective for not pursuing all the issues that had
whenever appellant been presented to the PCRA court. The Superior Court
alleges ineffective- denied the pro se petition but directed appellate coun-
nesssel to comply with the procedure established 
in
nessvioatestheCommonwealth v. Battle."1 The Battle procedure applied
prohibition against when a represented defendant filed a pro se petition
hybrid representation. seeking appointment of new counsel based upon the
alleged ineffectiveness of appellate counsel. It re-
quired appellate counsel to file a petition for remand in response to the pro se filing
providing the court with an evaluation of the claims raised by the defendant. 12
Based upon the petition and the record, the Superior Court then determined
whether remand for the appointment of new counsel was required. The Battle pro-
cedure was designed to provide a mechanism for judicial review of pro se claims of
aeeineffectiveness of appellate counsel.3
In Jette, the Superior Court concluded that the defendant was entitled to appoint-
ment of new counsel in the PCRA court. The court directed new PCRA counsel to
examine Jette's pro se PCRA petition, consult with Jette with respect to claims he
wished to raise, and to prepare a new amended petition presenting those claims
counsel deemed meritorious.
The Supreme Court reversed finding that the "Battle procedure" was contrary to
its holding in Commonwealth v. Ellis14 which rejected hybrid representation on
direct appeal. In Ellis, the Court ruled that the Superior Court was not required to
8. 42 Pa.C.S. §9545(b).
9. 23 A.3d 1032 (Pa. 2011).
10. Jette was preceded by Commonwealth v. Colavita, 993 A.2d 874, 893 n.12 (Pa. 2010). In Colavita, the
Court, citing its decision in Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d 875, 880 n.4 (Pa. 2009), held that a defendant
denied PCRA relief could not raise for the first time the ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel on direct or dis-
cretionary review.
11. 879 A.2d 266 (Pa. Super. 2005)
12. In Battle, the court stressed that it did not review the pro se filing, but rather the counsel's analysis
of the issues raised pro se.
13. While not stated in Battle, without a mechanism in the appellate court to review pro se claims of
appellate counsel ineffectiveness, such claims would escape judicial review because the PCRA time bar
would likely preclude the defendant from challenging the effectiveness of appellate counsel in a subse-
quent PCRA petition.
14. 626 A.2d 1137 (Pa. 1993).
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review pro se briefs filed by represented appellants. The Court noted that in Ellis it
had set out the options available to a represented appellant dissatisfied with appel-
late counsel: petition to terminate his representation and represent himself on appea 15
or allow counsel to proceed, and if the conviction is affirmed, challenge counsel's in-
effectiveness in a post conviction proceeding.16 The Court stated that Ellis did not
require appellate counsel to petition for remand whenever appellant alleged the
ineffectiveness of current counsel. The Supreme Court applied the rationale of Ellis
to PCRA petitions in Commonwealth v. Pursell17 holding that PCRA courts are not
required to consider pro se filings of defendants when represented by counsel.
The Supreme Court also found the Battle procedure did not conform to the rules
of appellate procedure which provide that pro se filings by appellants represented
by counsel are not to be docketed but instead forwarded to counsel to consider
whether the claims merit consideration by the court. In addition, the procedure was
in tension with the long-standing rule that an indigent appellant must remain with
appointed counsel through conclusion of the appeal absent retention of private
counsel, a motion for change of counsel or a timely petition for self-representation.
The Court also found that Battle was inconsistent with the traditional appellate re-
view model by requiring the appellate court to assess the effectiveness of appellate
counsel prior to determining whether the defendant was entitled to relief based
upon the actual claims advanced by counsel on appeal. Finally, the Court noted that
the Battle procedure allowed certain defendants to avoid the Court's restrictions on
serial petitions for post-conviction relief by permitting, in effect, a second petition
alleging the ineffectiveness of appellate counsel. Moreover, by permitting consider-
ation of appellate counsel ineffectiveness on appeal from the denial of PCRA relief,
the Battle procedure was contrary to the Court's recent holding that claims of PCRA
counsel ineffectiveness could not be raised for the first time on direct or discre-
tionary appeal.' 8
INNOCENCE AND ELIGIBILITY FOR PCRA RELIEF
In Commonwealth v. Haun,19 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered whether
an admission of guilt precludes a defendant from seeking PCRA relief. A year after
Haun was convicted and sentenced, he sought PCRA relief claiming trial counsel
failed to protect his right to appeal the sentence imposed. At the PCRA hearing, trial
15. Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998) (when appellant elects self-representation on appeal,
Superior Court must remand matter to trial court for determination of whether waiver of counsel is
knowing, intelligent and voluntary).
16. In Commonwealth v. Rogers, 645 A.2d 223 (Pa. 1994), the Court held that a criminal appellant who
challenges the effectiveness of appellate counsel cannot terminate counsel after counsel has filed appel-
late briefs "simply because he wishes to file pro se appellate briefs."
17. 724 A.2d 293 (Pa. 1999).
18. Commonwealth v. Colavita, 993 A.2d 874 (Pa. 2010) (citing Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d 875, 880 n.4
(Pa. 2009). By barring claims of ineffective assistance of counsel from being raised on appeal from the de-
nial of PCRA relief, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has deprived defendants of the only meaningful
method to protect their right to effective assistance of counsel in PCRA proceedings. See Commonwealth
v. Albert, 561 A.2d 736, 738 (Pa. 1989) (right to counsel in PCRA proceeding included the "concomitant
right to effective assistance of counsel."); Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 720 A.2d 693, 700 (Pa. 1998) (finding
enforceable right to effective post-conviction counsel."). See also Commonwealth v. Masker, _A.3d
fn. 6 (Pa. Super. 2011) (Bowers, J., concurring and dissenting).
19. 32 A.3d 697 (Pa. 2011).
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counsel denied that Haun had requested an appeal. During cross examination of
Haun, Haun admitted, over objection, that he had committed the acts for which he
had been convicted. Without deciding the issue of whether or not Haun had asked
his lawyer to pursue an appeal, the PCRA court denied relief on the grounds that
Haun's admission of guilt rendered him ineligible to obtain PCRA relief.20 The
Superior Court reversed and remanded holding that a construction of the PCRA
that precluded consideration of claims by defendants who had admitted their guilt
would lead to a bifurcated system of post-conviction review which had been re-
jected by the Supreme Court.
In affirming the decision of the Superior Court, the Supreme Court noted that it
had previously rejected an interpretation of the Act as applying only to defendants
convicted of crimes they did not commit. In Commonwealth v. Chester,21 the Court
held that claims arising during the penalty phase of a capital case were cognizable
under the PCRA. The Court acknowledged that the prejudice requirement in
Section 9543(a)(2)(ii) governing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel could lead
to the conclusion that the Act was not intended to apply to capital sentencing. The
Court held that such an interpretation would be inconsistent with the mandate in
Section 9542 that the Act be the"sole means"of obtaining post-conviction relief.The
Court also noted its decision in Commonwealth v. Lantzy.22 In Lantzy, the Court con-
sidered whether a defendant was entitled to relief under the Act where counsel
failed to file a direct appeal.23 In holding that the PCRA provides the"exclusive rem-
edy" where counsel fails to protect a defendant's right to direct appeal, the Court
noted that if the PCRA applied only to lawyer error at trial, the result would be a bi-
furcated system of review where some claims, considered outside the PCRA, would
be subject to habeas corpus review. Specifically addressing the issue of innocence,
the Court held that a defendant who otherwise satisfied the requirements of the
PCRA was not required to "establish his innocence or otherwise demonstrate the
merits"of the issues which would have been raised on direct appeal.24
In holding in Haun that a "concession of guilt" does not per se preclude a defen-
dant from seeking PCRA relief, the Court noted that the Legislature had more than
a decade to respond to the Court's multiple expressions of why it believed the
General Assembly preferred a broader construction of the scope of the PCRA but
had not done so. Finally, using a principle governing statutory construction,25 the
Court resolved the tension in Section 9542 between the innocence language and the
20. The PCRA court's decision was based on the innocence language in 42 Pa.C.S. §9542 and the
Superior Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 712 A.2d 288 (Pa. Super. 1998) holding that the prej-
udice requirement in Section 9543(a)(2)(ii) governing claims of ineffectiveness of counsel required a
defendant to provide evidence that he was wrongfully convicted. The court failed to note that Superior
Court's decision in Lantzy had been reversed. Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 736 A.2d 564 (Pa. 1999).
21. 733 A.2d. 1242 (Pa. 1999).
22. 736 A.2d 564 (Pa. 1999).
23. In Lantzy, the defendant had pleaded guilty and like Haun, sought to challenge the discretionary
aspects of the sentence imposed on him
24. The Court noted that it had followed the rationale of Lantzy in Commonwealth v. Liebel, 825 A.2d 630
(Pa. 2003) where it concluded that the defendant could seek PCRA relief where counsel had failed to pro-
tect the defendant's right to petition for allowance of appeal, and in Commonwealth v. ex rel Dadario v.
Goldberg, 773 A.2d 126 (2001) where the Court held that the PCRA encompassed claims of ineffectiveness
of counsel arising during plea negotiations.
25. 1 Pa.C.S. §1934.
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"sole means" provision by concluding that the "sole means" language should pre-
dominate because it is last in order of position in Section 9542.
DEFICIENT APPELLATE BRIEF AND PRESUMED PREJUDICE
When a defendant challenges the effectiveness of trial2 6, appellate 27, or PCRA
counsel28, the general rule is that to obtain relief the defendant must establish both
inadequate performance and prejudice. 29 In United States v. Cronic,3 0 the United
States Supreme Court recognized that some"circumstances ... are so likely to prej-
udice the accused"31 that prejudice could be presumed. Prejudice could be pre-
sumed, the Court held, where counsel "entirely fails to subject the prosecution's
case to meaningful adversarial testing.. .. "32 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
presumed prejudice where counsel ignored defendant's request and failed to file a
direct appeal,3 3 failed to file a statement of matters complained of on appeal,34 or
failed to file a requested petition for allowance of appeal.35
In several recent cases, presumed prejudice has been argued when counsel files
a brief so deficient that the Superior Court is limited in its review of the defendant's
claims. In Commonwealth v. Reed,36 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed a
Superior Court decision in which the court presumed prejudice where counsel did
not include notes of testimony in the certified record and filed an appellate brief
that failed to cite appropriate authority that resulted in a waiver of Reed's argument
for relief. In reversing the Superior Court, the Supreme Court concluded the Cronic
exception did not apply because unlike Lantzy, Halley and Liebel, counsel's failures
did not deprive Reed of his constitutional right to appeal. Noting that the Superior
Court did not quash Reed's appeal and that the issues were sufficiently presented
to allow the Superior Court to address the merits of Reed's arguments, the Court
characterized counsel's omissions as "narrowing the ambit" of Reed's appeal and
26. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45. 71 (1932); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 377 (1986) ("right to
counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel').
27. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387.396 (1985) (finding right to effective counsel extends to first appeal).
28. Commonwealth v. Albert, 561 A.2d 736,738 (Pa. 1989) (holding that rule-based right to counsel in a
PCRA proceeding includes the "concomitant right to effective assistance of counsel" in the PCRA court
and on appeal). See also Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 720 A.2d 693, 699 (Pa. 1998) (appointment of counsel
pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 904 carries with it an"enforceable right to effective post-conviction counsel").
29. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973 (Pa. 1987), the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the federal standard of ineffectiveness set out in Strickland and
the Pennsylvania test were analogous. Under the Pierce test, a court evaluates an ineffectiveness claim un-
der a three-part performance and prejudice standard. Prongs one and two of the standard concern coun-
sel's performance. To overcome the presumed effectiveness of counsel, the defendant must that the issue
underlying the claim of ineffectiveness has arguably merit and that defense counsel's act or omission was
not reasonably designed to advance the interests of the defendant. Prejudice, the third prong, is satisfied
if the defendant shows"there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
30. 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
31. Id. at 658.
32. Id. at 659. For an application of Cronic, see e.g., Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 88 ((1988) (failure to
appoint counsel for purposes of direct appeal). See also Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004) (noting Cronic
is limited to cases where"counsel has entirely failed to function as the client's advocate").
33. Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 736 A.2d 564, 571 (Pa. 1999).
34. Commonwealth v. Halley, 870 A.2d 795, 801 (Pa. 2005).
35. Commonwealth v. Liebel, 825 A.2d 630, 635 ((Pa. 2003).
36. Commonwealth v. Reed, 971 A.2d 1216 (Pa. 2009).
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not a complete failure to function as Reed's advocate which would warrant a pre-
sumption of prejudice.3 7
In Commonwealth v. Fink,3 8 the Superior Court distinguished Reed finding that the
deficient brief filed by Fink's counsel entitled Fink to a presumption of prejudice.
On direct appeal of Fink's conviction, the Superior Court found the sole issue raised
in Fink's appeal concerning the admissibility of his statement to the police was
waived because Fink's appellate brief failed to adequately develop the issue. The
court did not conduct an alternative merits review. Instead of quashing the appeal
based on the deficient brief, the court affirmed the judgment of sentence. Fink sub-
sequently filed a PCRA petition requesting the trial court to reinstate his right to
direct appeal based upon the ineffectiveness of appellate counsel. The PCRA court
denied relief finding that Fink had failed to establish that his lawyer was ineffective.
In vacating the trial court's order denying post-conviction relief and reinstating
Fink's right to direct appeal, the Superior Court concluded that counsel's failure to
"offer citation and authority" necessary for the court's consideration of the circum-
stances in which Fink gave his statement to the police deprived Fink of his right to
appellate review and thereby"compels application of the ... presumption of preju-
dice."The court held that Reed did not preclude the court from reinstating Fink's
right to direct appeal. The court acknowledged that even though the merits panel
that considered Fink's direct appeal affirmed the judgment of sentence rather than
quashing the appeal, the panel, in contrast to Reed, did not consider the merits of
Fink's claims. This difference, the court noted, was "critical" rather than the termi-
nology used by the panel in resolving the appeal. The court held that where brief-
ing deficiencies preclude consideration of the merits of an appellant's claims and
the court does not undertake an alternative merits review, the defendant is entitled
to the presumption of prejudice when challenging the effectiveness of appellate
counsel.
INEFFECTIVENESS AND DIRECT APPEAL
In Roe v. Flores-Ortega,39 the United States Supreme Court held that counsel has a
constitutional obligation to consult with the defendant about the right to appeal
when the defendant has indicated an interest in so doing or a rational defendant
under the circumstances would want to appeal. If lack of consultation is established,
the defendant is entitled to reinstatement of his appeal rights if he demonstrates a
reasonable probability that he would have appealed but for lack of consultation. 40
In Commonwealth v. Carter,41 the defendant filed a post-conviction petition seeking
reinstatement of his right to direct appeal on grounds that counsel had failed to con-
sult with him about an appeal after his conviction. Following appointment of coun-
sel and the filing of an amended petition, the PCRA court dismissed the petition
without a hearing. The PCRA court concluded that a hearing was not warranted be-
37. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Saylor stated that representation by counsel whose omission fore-
closes effective merits review of all claims raised on appeal is the "functional equivalent of having no
counsel at all." 971 A.2d at 1228 (Saylor, J. dissenting).
38. 24 A.3d 426 (Pa. Super. 2011).
39. 528 U.S. 470 (2000).
40. Id. at 480.
41. 21 A.3d 680 (Pa. Super. 2011).
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cause the amended petition did not certify trial counsel as a proposed witness.4 2 In
addition, relying on Commonwealth v. Bath,43 the PCRA court held that the defendant
could not establish prejudice because the issues he claimed he would have raised
on appeal were frivolous. In reversing and remanding the case, the Superior Court
held that the PCRA court erred in dismissing the petition without a hearing. The
court held that when a defendant seeks relief on the basis of a Roe claim, the PCRA
court must hold an evidentiary hearing in order to make factual findings regarding
the nature and extent of the trial counsel's discussions with the defendant about fil-
ing an appeal.The court found the PCRA court's reliance on Bath misplaced because
Bath concerned counsel's failure to consult regarding discretionary appeal and not
direct appeal as of right.
DNA TESTING
In 2002 the Legislature amended the PCRA to provide for post conviction DNA
testing." Section 9543.1 establishes a procedure by which a defendant in custody
may seek DNA testing by filing a motion45 with the sentencing court.The motion must
specify the evidence to be tested and acknowledge that if the motion is granted, any
data obtained from samples or test results may be entered in law enforcement data-
bases.46 In addition, the motion must assert the defendant's innocence of the crime
for which he or she was convicted.47 The defendant must present a prima facie case
demonstrating that the identity or participation of the perpetrator in the crime was
at issue at trial and that exculpatory DNA testing would establish the defendant's
actual innocence of the offense. 8 The defendant is not required to show that DNA
testing would be favorable.4 9 The court, however, must review the motion and trial
record and make a determination as to whether "there is a reasonable probability
that DNA testing would produce exculpatory evidence"s0 that would establish the
defendant's actual innocence. 51 After testing, the defendant may petition for post
conviction relief during the 60-day period following notification of the test results.
Requests for DNA tests are "separate and distinct from claims" arising under the
PCRA. 52 Neither the PCRA's one-year time bar5 3 nor the right to counsel54 apply to
a motion for DNA testing.
In Commonwealth v. Wright55, the Supreme Court considered the question of
whether a defendant whose voluntary confession is admitted into evidence against
42. Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(A)(15).
43. 907 A.2d 619 (Pa. 2006).
44. 42 Pa.C.S.§9543.1.
45. 42 Pa.C.S. §9543.1(a). Commonwealth v. Weeks, 831 A.2d 1194,1196 (Pa. Super. 2003) (request for DNA
testing should be made by motion and not in a PCRA petition).
46. 42 Pa.C.S. §9543.1(c)(1)(iii).
47. 42 Pa.C.S. §9543.1(c)(2)(i).
48. 42 Pa.C.S. §9543.1(c)(3).
49. Commonwealth v. Smith, 889 A.2d 852,854 (Pa. Super. 2005), appeal denied, 905 A.2d 500 (Pa. 2006)
50. Id.
51. 42 Pa.C.S. §9543.1(d)(2).
52. 42 Pa.C.S. §9543.1(f)(1).
53. Commonwealth v. Conway, 14 A.3d 101, 108 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal denied, 29 A.3d 795 (Pa. 2011).
54. Commonwealth v. Brooks, 875 A.2d 1141, 1147 (Pa. Super. 2005).
55. 14 A.3d 798 (Pa. 2011).
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him at trial is precluded from establishing a prima facie case demonstrating that
DNA testing would establish his actual innocence.
Wright was convicted of rape and murder. The evidence introduced at trial in-
cluded Wright's confession which the trial court had found was not the product of
coercion. In addition, DNA evidence was admitted establishing the victim's blood
on clothing found in the defendant's possession. Following direct appeal and an un-
successful PCRA challenge on grounds of trial counsel ineffectiveness, Wright filed
a motion for an advanced form of DNA testing which he claimed was not available
at the time of his trial. Wright claimed that such testing would demonstrate his
actual innocence.
Relying on the Superior Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Young, 56 the PCRA
court denied Wright's motion on grounds that his voluntary confession precluded
him from making a prima facie case that"DNA testing ... assuming exculpatory re-
sults, would establish.... the applicant's actual innocence" as required by Section
9543.1 (c)(3)(ii)(A). In addition, the court concluded that based on the record, there
was no reasonable possibility that DNA testing would "produce exculpatory evi-
dence that would establish ... actual innocence."The Superior Court affirmed the
decision of the PCRA court on the basis of its decision in Young. In Young, the court
found that the defendant's voluntary confession barred him from asserting a claim
of actual innocence and thereby precluded him from seeking DNA under Section
9543.1.
In Wright, the Supreme Court concluded that Young was wrongly decided. In inter-
preting the relevant language of Section 9543.1, the Court noted that the Legislature
did not include an explicit prohibition in the statute preventing a defendant who
has confessed to a crime, but otherwise meets the requirements of the statute, from
obtaining DNA testing merely because the existence of the confession. Nor could
the Court "perceive any reasonable reading" of the entire statute which would "im-
pliedly support such a restrictive construction."The"flaw"in Young, the Court stated,
was its conclusion that a determination of voluntariness was "completely determi-
native" of the question of the factual accuracy of the confession. The Court noted
that this was improper since the issue of the voluntariness of a confession is "en-
tirely separate" from the issue of whether the defendant's admissions conclusively
establish that he or she committed the acts in question. The Court stated that it had
long recognized that a confession is not, in and of itself, sufficient to convict and
noted the "countless situations" where persons confess to crimes that they did not
commit. Because the PCRA had dismissed Wright's motion solely on the basis of
Young, the Court remanded the case to the PCRA court to determine whether
Wright's factual allegations in his motion for DNA testing established a prima facie
case of his innocence of the crimes charged.
In Commonwealth v. Conway,57 the defendant sought DNA testing of items found
near the victim of a stabbing he was convicted of in 1987. The items included blood-
stained towels, fingernail clippings and piece of cloth that had been tied around the
victim's hands.The conviction was based on circumstantial evidence.The defendant
claimed to have discovered the body and admitted touching it to determine if the
victim was alive. Although the prosecution presented evidence during the trial that
56. 873 A.2d 720 (Pa. Super. 2005).
57. 14 A.3d 101 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal denied, 29 A.3d 795 (Pa. 2011).
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suggested that the victim had scratched the defendant, no DNA evidence or other
scientific evidence was introduced during trial that tied the defendant to the body
of the victim or to the area where the body was found. The PCRA court denied the
motion for DNA testing on the basis that the defendant had failed to present a prima
facie case demonstrating that DNA testing would establish his actual innocence.
In the Superior Court, the defendant acknowledged that the absence of his DNA
on the tested items would not provide evidence of his innocence. He nevertheless
argued that if testing revealed evidence of a third person on the items connected
with the crime, such a result would point to the presence of a separate assailant.The
defendant also argued that any DNA results that point to the presence of a third
person could be entered in state and federal data banks which might lead to the
identification of a separate assailant. The Commonwealth claimed that any DNA
results would be speculative. More specifically, the Commonwealth, relying on Com-
monwealth v. Smith,58 argued that defendants cannot seek DNA testing in order to
run the results through DNA data banks. In Smith, the court affirmed the denial of
the defendant's motion for DNA testing of the victims'fingernails finding there was
no evidence that the victim scratched her assailant. In light of the overwhelming
physical and scientific evidence that the Commonwealth presented at trial, the court
concluded that the defendant's request was "entirely speculative". In a footnote, the
court rejected the defendant's data bank argument as simply adding another"layer
of speculation" to the defendant's already speculative rationale for testing.59 In re-
versing the PCRA court, the Superior Court in Conway held that the footnote in
Smith did not foreclose the defendant's data bank argument. The footnote, court
stated, was based on the fact that Smith had failed to demonstrate how potential
DNA evidence could be obtained from the victim's fingernails. The court noted that
in Conway, by contrast, investigators had collected numerous items from the victim
that had come into contact with the hands of the assailant. DNA testing of the items,
the court stated, would add to the "reliability of the reconstruction" of the events
surrounding the death of the victim. The court held that the DNA statute is reme-
dial and "should be interpreted liberally" so as to permit, in appropriate cases, the
comparison of tests results with information complied in data banks for the purpose
of excluding persons charged or convicted of a crime.
In Commonwealth v. Williams,60 the Superior Court reviewed the dismissal of
Williams's untimely PCRA petition seeking DNA testing of hair samples found in a
wig discovered near the crime scene. The petition also claimed that trial counsel was
ineffective in failing to obtain DNA testing of the wig prior to trial. Williams argued
that his request for DNA testing rendered his petition timely and that he had es-
tablished a prima facie case for testing the hair samples in the PCRA court.
In affirming the dismissal of PCRA petition, the Superior Court stated that when
a petition commingles PCRA claims with a request for DNA testing, a court should
first address the request for DNA testing. In finding that Williams did not meet the
threshold requirements for DNA testing under Section 9543.1(a)(2), the court noted
that the hair samples at issue were discovered before Williams's trial, that DNA test-
ing was available at the time of his trial and that the trial court had not refused fund-
58. 889 A.2d 582 (Pa. Super 2005), appeal denied, 905 A.2d 500 (Pa. 2006).
59. Id. at 586, n. 6.
60. - A.3d - (Pa. Super. 2011).
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ing for the testing. In addition, the court concluded that Williams had failed to es-
tablish that the identity of the perpetrator was at issue in his trial and that testing of
the samples, assuming exculpatory results, would establish his actual innocence. The
court noted that three witnesses had identified Williams and that another witness
testified that Williams had admitted to the crime and to wearing the wig. Moreover,
the court found that the PCRA court correctly concluded that if hair found in the
wig was DNA tested and found not to be Williams, the lack of Williams's DNA in the
sample would not disprove that Williams wore the wig during the crime nor prove
that he did not wear the wig on the day in question. Finally, the court concluded that
Williams's PCRA petition filed eight years after his conviction became final was
properly dismissed as untimely. While the one-year time bar for PCRA petitions
does not apply to motions for DNA testing,61 once the PCRA court concluded that
Williams was not entitled to testing, his allegation that counsel was ineffective for
not seeking testing did not constitute an exception to the one-year filing period gov-
erning PCRA petitions.62
RIGHT TO AND WAIVER OF PCRA COUNSEL
Pa.R. Crim.P. 904(C) requires the PCRA court to appoint counsel to represent an
indigent defendant filing a first petition for post-conviction relief. Once counsel has
been appointed, he is obligated to "continue representation until the case is con-
cluded or is granted leave by the court to withdraw" 63 or the defendant waives
counsel.
In Commonwealth v. Willis,64 the Superior Court concluded that appointed coun-
sel and the PCRA court effectively denied Willis his right to counsel. After Willis
timely filed a pro se petition alleging ineffectiveness of his guilty plea counsel and
the PCRA court appointed Willis counsel, counsel, instead of filing an amended
petition, filed a petition to withdraw6 5 and a "no merit" letter. Without ruling on the
petition to withdraw, the court held a hearing on Willis's pro se petition at which
counsel was present. Therefore, Willis filed a pro se amended petition. Counsel again
petitioned to withdraw on the basis that the issues presented in the amended pro se
petition were meritless. Again, the PCRA court did not rule on counsel's petition
to withdraw. Rather, the PCRA court held a second hearing on the pro se amended
petition with counsel present. Following the hearing, the PCRA court denied Willis
relief and granted counsel's petition to withdraw. Thereafter, Willis filed a pro se
appeal alleging inter alia the ineffectiveness of appointed PCRA counsel.
The Superior Court reversed the denial of relief by the PCRA court. Because the
PCRA court chose not to rule on counsel's petitions to withdraw, the court held that
counsel was "duty-bound" to act as Willis's lawyer at the PCRA hearings. Instead,
61. Commonwealth v. Conway, 14 A.2d 101, 108 n. 2 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal denied, 29 A.3d 795 (Pa. 2011).
62. Commonwealth v. Bronshtein, 752 A.2d 868,871 (Pa. 2000) (holding that ineffectiveness does not con-
stitute an exception to the PCRA time requirements). But see Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264,1271
(Pa. 2007) (recognizing that in limited circumstances an ineffectiveness claim may fall under newly dis-
covered fact exception to the one-year filing period where counsel abandons the defendant and aban-
donment was unknown to the defendant).
63. Commonwealth v. White, 871 A.2d 1291, 1294 (Pa. Super. 2005).
64. 29 A.3d 393 (Pa. Super. 2011).
65. Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988).
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the court found that appointed counsel used the hearings in an effort to persuade
the PCRA court that Willis's claims were without merit, thereby depriving Willis of
his right to counsel. In addition, the Superior Court faulted the PCRA court for fail-
ing to take action when it became clear that appointed counsel was not advocating
on behalf of his client and specifically for conducting the PCRA hearings prior to
ruling on the petitions to withdraw. The court also noted that the PCRA court erred
in permitting hybrid representation 66 when it accepted and considered Willis's pro
se amended petition after counsel had been appointed. The PCRA court also erred,
the court concluded, when it granted appointed counsel's petitions to withdraw de-
spite the fact that the petitions were never filed.67The court directed the PCRA court
on remand to appoint Willis new PCRA counsel.
In Commonwealth v. Stossel,68 the defendant filed a pro se PCRA petition using the
standard form provided by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. 69 On the
form, Stossel checked the box indicating that he did not have a lawyer and was with-
out resources to obtain a lawyer. In addition, he checked the box indicating that he
did not want a lawyer to represent him in the proceeding. As a result, the PCRA court
did not appoint him counsel. The court dismissed the petition without a hearing,
finding it was untimely and did not allege an exception to the timeliness require-
ment.70 In his pro se appeal, Stossel argued that the PCRA court erred in dismissing
his petition as untimely because his case met the "governmental interference"71 ex-
ception to the timeliness requirement.
The Superior Court concluded that the PCRA court erred in dismissing Stossel's
petition without first holding an on-the-record hearing that would permit the court
to determine whether Stossel's waiver of counsel was knowing, intelligent and vol-
untary. The court noted that Stossel was entitled to representation notwithstanding
the fact that the petition was untimely because it was his first PCRA petition and he
indicated he was unable to employ counsel. 72 The court held that Stossel did not
waive his right to counsel by checking the box on the DOC form. Instead, Stossel's
act should have prompted the PCRA court to conduct a waiver hearing required by
Commonwealth v. Grazier73 in order to elicit the information required by Pa.R.Crim.P.
12174 before permitting Stossel to proceed pro se. Finally, the court held that notwith-
standing Stossel's failure to challenge his waiver of his right to counsel, where a first
time indigent petitioner has been denied his right to counsel or failed to properly
waive that right, the court is required to raise the error sua sponte and remand the
case to the PCRA court.
66. Commonwealth v. Jette, 23 A.3d 1032 (Pa. 2011) (reiterating"long-standing policy that precludes hy-
brid representation.").
67. Commonwealth v. Karanicolas, 836 A.2d 940,947 (Pa. Super. 2003) (holding that before attorney is per-
mitted to withdraw, counsel must file and obtain court approval of no-merit letter).
68. 17 A.3d 1286 (Pa. Super. 2011).
69. DC-198 (Rev. 7-01).
70. 42 Pa.C.S. §9545 (b)(1) (i)-(iii).
71. 42 Pa.C. S. §9545 (b)(1)(i).
72. Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(C). See also Commonwealth v. Smith, 818 A.2d 494, 500-01 (Pa. 2003) (petitioner enti-
tled to appointment of counsel where first petition appears untimely in order for counsel to determine
whether any of the exceptions to the one-year filing period apply)
73. 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998)
74. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 970 A.2d 455,457 (Pa. Super. 2009) (noting that subsections (b) and (c) of
Pa.R.Crim. P. 121 do not apply in the PCRA context but remainder of information sought by rule"clearly
impacts"on whether a defendant fully understands his decision to forgo PCRA counsel).
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The issue of waiver of PCRA counsel was also considered by the Superior Court
in Commonwealth v. Figueroa.75 Following his conviction in 1988, prior to sentencing
Figueroa filed a pro se motion alleging the ineffectiveness of trial counsel. Due to
confusion in the trial court, two lawyers were appointed as substitute counsel but
neither took any action in the case. Ultimately, the trial court appointed a third
lawyer and, thereafter, denied Figueroa's post-trial motions and imposed sentence
in 1993. Although represented by counsel, Figueroa filed an appeal pro se which lead
to then-counsel withdrawing and new counsel being appointed for the appeal.
Although newly appointed counsel failed to file an appellate brief, the Superior
Court decided the appeal based on Figueroa's pro se brief which included claims of
trial counsel ineffectiveness. Following denial of relief by the Superior Court,
Figueroa filed a timely PCRA petition alleging the Superior Court violated the rule
against hybrid representation when it accepted and relied upon his pro se brief when
he was represented by counsel. Both the PCRA court and Superior Court denied relief.
Nine years later, a federal court concluded that Figueroa had been denied his
right to counsel on direct appeal and ordered that his right to direct appeal be rein-
stated. Several years later, Figueroa filed a counseled nunc pro tunc direct appeal.
After the Superior Court denied relief, Figueroa filed a PCRA petition alleging
among other issues the ineffectiveness of direct appeal counsel. Concluding the pe-
tition was a second petition, the PCRA court did not appoint Figueroa counsel and
dismissed the petition on grounds that he had failed to establish a miscarriage of
justice, the standard that applies to second or subsequent petitions for post-convic-
tion relief.76
In his pro se appeal, the Commonwealth conceded that the PCRA court erred in
treating Figueroa's petition as a second petition and denying him counsel. In his re-
ply brief, Figueroa stated he did not want counsel appointed and wished to proceed
in the appeal pro se. The Superior Court found that the PCRA court erred in treating
Figueroa's PCRA petition as a second petition because it was filed after a nunc pro
tunc appeal.7 As a result, the PCRA court erred in failing to appoint Figueoa coun-
sel pursuant to Pa.R.Crim. 904(C). In light of Figueoa's desire to proceed pro se on
appeal78, the Superior Court remanded the case to the PCRA court to conduct a
hearing pursuant to Commonwealth v. Grazier79 informing Figueoa of his right to
counsel in the PCRA court and on appeal.
INEFFECTIVENESS CLAIMS AND APPEAL NUNC PRO TUNC
In 2002, in Commonwealth v. Grant8 o, the Supreme Court abandoned its long-
standing rule that claims of ineffectiveness had to be raised by new counsel at the
75. 29 A.2d 1177 (Pa. Super. 2011).
76. Commonwealth v. Lawson, 549 A.2d 107 (Pa. 1988).
77. Commonwealth v. Fowler, 930 A.2d 586, 591 (Pa. Super. 2007) ("it is now well[-] established that a
PCRA petition brought after an appeal nunc pro tunc is considered [an] appellant's first PCRA petition.")
(brackets in original).
78. In Commonwealth v. Staton, 12 A.3d 277 (Pa. 2010), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court questioned
whether a defendant has a right to self-representation on appeal in light of the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Martinez v. Court ofAppeal of California, 528 U.S. 152 (2000) in which the Court held that
there is no federal constitutional right to self-representation on appeal. The court in Staton noted that its
decision in Grazier was premised on the federal constitution and that it had yet to determine whether the
right to self-representation was protected by the Pennsylvania Constitution.
79. 713 A.2d 81 ((Pa. 1998).
80. 813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002).
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first opportunity, even if that first opportunity was direct appeal and the issue had
not been presented to the trial court. Under Grant, claims of trial counsel ineffec-
tiveness are no longer considered on direct appeal, but deferred to the post-convic-
tion process. In Commonwealth v. Bomar8 l, the Supreme Court held that Grant did
not apply when defendant's claims of ineffectiveness were raised by new counsel in
a post-trial motion and the trial court heard testimony of trial counsel and ad-
dressed the ineffectiveness claims in its opinion.
In several post-Bomar cases, members of the Supreme Court expressed reserva-
tions about using post-trial motions to raise claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness
and subsequent review of the claims on direct appeal.82 More recently, in Common-
wealth v. Wright8, Justice Eakin writing for the Court stated that "collateral claims
should not be reviewed on post-verdict motions unless the defendant waives his
right to PCRA review because the PCRA does not afford the right to two collateral
attacks."8 The issue was addressed again in Commonwealth v. Liston85 and in Common-
wealth v. Montalvo.86 In Liston, the Supreme Court held that the Superior Court had
"overstepped its authority" when it held that whenever a PCRA court reinstates
direct appeal it must also reinstate the right to file post-sentence motions thereby
allowing the defendant to raise any issue of trial counsel ineffectiveness.87 In a con-
curring opinion, Chief Justice Castille rejected the use of post-trial motions to raise
ineffectiveness claims unless "accompanied by an express, knowing and voluntary
waiver of further PCRA review."88 In Montalvo,89 Chief Justice Castille in a concur-
ring opinion, directed lower courts not to review ineffectiveness claims raised in
post-trial motions unless the defendant waives his right to post-conviction review.90
The status of Bomar post- Liston and Montalvo was at issue in Commonwealth v.
Barnett91 where the Superior Court considered claims of ineffectiveness raised in a
81. 826 A.2d 831 (Pa. 2003).
82. Commonwealth v. O'Berg, 880 A.2d 597, 605 (Pa. 2005) (Castille, J., concurring) ("... I do not believe
that this Court is remotely obligated to permit any criminal defendant -no sentence, short sentence, long
sentence, capital sentence-to raise collateral claims, such as ineffective assistance of counsel, as a matter
of right upon post-trial motions.") (emphasis in original); Commonwealth v. Rega, 933 A.2d 997, 1028 (Pa.
2007) (Cappy, C.J., concurring) ("My fear is that continued employment of the'Bomar' exception will even-
tually swallow the rule we announced in Grant governing the presentation of ineffectiveness claims.").
83. 961 A.2d 119 (Pa. 2008).
84. 961 A.2d at 148 n.22. Two of the four participating justices in Wright joined Justice Eakin in footnote 22.
85. 977 A.2d 1089 (Pa. 2009).
86. 986 A.2d 84 (Pa. 2009).
87. In Liston, the defendant sought PCRA relief on the basis that counsel had failed to protect his right
to direct appeal. In addition, the defendant raised claims of ineffectiveness during the trial. On appeal,
the Superior Court declined to address the claims of ineffectiveness occurring during trial relying upon
Grant. Instead, based on Bomar, the court adopted the procedure noted above. The court stated that the
procedure would permit the court, consistent with Bomar to review the defendant's ineffectiveness claims
in the ensuing direct appeal thereby saving judicial time and the need for the defendant to file a second
PCRA raising the same claims later in the process. See Commonwealth v. Liston, 941 A.2d 1279 (Pa. Super.
2008) (en banc), overruled, 977 A.2d 1089 (Pa. 2009).
88. 977 A.2d at 1096 (Castille, C.J., concurring).Two of the five member Court in Liston joined the Chief
Justice's concurring opinion.
89. The Court agreed in Montalvo to hear claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness on direct appeal
because the record pertaining to the claims had been developed in the trail court prior to the Grant
decision.
90. 986 A.2d at 111 (Castille, C.J., concurring) ("As I made clear in my recent concurrence in [Liston]-
and in this regard I spoke for majority of the Liston Court- going forward, the lower courts should not
indulge hybrid review by invoking Bomar.").
91. 25 A.3d 371 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en banc).
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nunc pro tunc direct appeal. The decision in Barnett illustrates how the current process
is inefficient and time-consuming when ineffectiveness of counsel claims include a
claim that counsel failed to protect the defendant's right to direct appeal.92
Barnett sought post-conviction relief alleging ineffectiveness of counsel during
trial and on appeal because claims presented on direct appeal were deemed waived
due to a deficient brief filed by trial counsel. The PCRA court held a full evidentiary
hearing on the claims of ineffectiveness during trial and on appeal during which
Barnett and trial counsel testified. After the PCRA court denied relief and Barnett
appealed, the Superior Court did not address the claims of ineffectiveness during
trial but simply reinstated Barnett's right to direct appeal. In the nunc pro tunc appeal
filed by new counsel, Barnett abandoned the claims that were raised and deemed
waived on direct appeal and only raised the claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness
which had been considered and ruled on the PCRA court. As a result, Barnett was
not seeking"hybrid review" of traditional direct appeal issues and collateral claims
in his nunc pro tunc direct appeal. Nonetheless, the Superior Court refused to review
the ineffectiveness claims notwithstanding the fact that the claims had been fully
developed in the PCRA court. Instead, the court dismissed the claims without prej-
udice to raise them in a new PCRA proceeding. The Court concluded that based on
Wright and Liston, it could not review Barnett's claims of trial counsel ineffective-
ness.The court stated that the"primary teaching" of Liston and Wright is that defen-
dants are not entitled to "two chances at collateral review... 93 That would occur,
the court concluded, if it reviewed the PCRA court's decision that counsel was not
ineffective during trial absent a waiver by Barnett of his right to seek PCRA relief.
Going forward, the court stated it would no longer review fully developed ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal absent a waiver of further PCRA
review in the trial court. As Judge Shogan noted in his concurring and dissenting
opinion in Barnett, neither Wright nor Liston addressed the scope, form and timing
of the waiver required to obtain review of ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal 94
nor are these issues or Barnett's right to direct appeal95 are addressed by the majority
in Barnett. For Barnett, the Superior Court's decision postpones appellate review of
his claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness until he files a new PCRA petition raising
the ineffectiveness claims a second time and appeals a second time96 from the de-
nial of PCRA relief.97
92. The Supreme Court has granted allowance of appeal in Commonwealth v. Holmes, 996 A.2d 479 (Pa.
2010) to resolve"[w]hether the claims of ineffectiveness of counsel which are the exclusive subject of this
nunc pro tunc direct appeal:(1) are reviewable on direct appeal under Commonwealth v. Bomar... (2) should
instead be deferred to collateral review under the general review in Commonwealth v. Grant .. .; or (3)
should instead be deemed reviewable on direct appeal only if accompanied by a specific waiver of the
right to pursue a first PCRA petition as of right."
93. 25 A.3d at 376.
94. Commonwealth v. Barnett, 25 A.3d 371, 379 (Pa. Super. 2011) (Shogan, J., concurring and dissenting)
95. Pa. Const. art. 5, §9.
96. As noted, the PCRA court had previously denied Barnett's ineffectiveness claims. The Superior
Court noted that the PCRA court could"dispos[e] of Barnett's ineffective assistance claims based on the
previously established record."25 A.3d at 377.
97. Barnett was followed in Commonwealth v. Funk, 29 A.3d 28 (Pa. Super. 2011) and Commonwealth v.
Blye, 33 A.3d 9 (Pa. Super. 2011).
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INEFFECTIVENESS AND CLASSIFICATION AS SEXUALLY
VIOLENT PREDATOR
In Commonwealth v. Masker,98 the Superior Court considered whether a claim of
ineffectiveness of counsel during the proceeding that led to the defendant being
classified as a sexually violent predator ("SVP") presents a cognizable claim under
the PCRA. After Masker pled guilty to various sexual offenses and was classified as
a SVP, he filed a PCRA petition challenging counsel's failure to advise him of his
right to remain silent at the classification proceeding. He also claimed counsel failed
to arrange for an expert witness to testify on his behalf at the proceeding and to
challenge the Assessment Board's use of his admissions during the proceeding. On
appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, the Superior Court concluded that Masker's
challenge to his lawyer's performance at the classification proceeding did not put in
question his conviction or sentence, and, as a result, did not present a cognizable
claim under the PCRA. The court noted that in Commonwealth v. Price,99 the Superior
Court ruled that classification of a defendant as an SVP, independent of a challenge
to his conviction or sentence, did not present a claim under the PCRA.
In Masker, the court found"no meaningful distinction" between the issue in Price,
namely a challenge to the determination that a defendant was an SVP and Masker's
claims that his lawyer was ineffective at the classification proceeding. In addition,
the court concluded that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Padilla v.
Kentucky did not compel a different result. The court stated that unlike Masker,
Padilla concerned a challenge to the validity of his guilty plea and not solely the col-
lateral consequences of deportation. The court did not address how Masker might
seek to vindicate his right to effective counsel other than noting that the PCRA is not
the exclusive means of obtaining collateral relief.100
INEFFECTIVENESS AND PSYCHOLOGIST-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
In Commonwealth v. Harris,101 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered the
scope of the psychologist-client privilege when the defendant asserts in a PCRA pe-
tition that trial counsel was ineffective in presenting the psychologist's testimony
during the penalty phase of his trial. In his petition, Harris claimed that trial coun-
sel was aware that the psychologist's evaluation was deficient because he had not
tested him for organic brain damage. He also claimed that the psychologist had not
performed appropriate testing even though he was aware that Harris's mental
health history suggested he had a cognitive disorder. After the PCRA court sched-
98. A.3d - (Pa. Super. 2011) (en banc).
99. 876 A.2d 988 (Pa. Super. 2005).
100. In a lengthy concurring and dissenting opinion, Judge Bowes argued that the PCRA applies to
claims of ineffectiveness of counsel at the SVP proceeding and noted that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has repeatedly stated its disapproval of a bifurcated system of reviewing ineffectiveness claims. In
addition, Judge Bowes noted that defendants have a right to effective counsel at an SVP hearing, that the
process of determining SVP status is clearly an aspect of the sentencing in a criminal case and that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth ex rel. Dadario v. Goldberg, 773 A.2d 126 (Pa. 2001) had
broadly interpreted the PCRA as applying to all"constitutionally-cognizable claims of ineffectiveness of
counsel. . . ." Finally, Judge Bowes noted the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's recent decision in
Commonwealth v. Haun, 32 A.3d. 697 (Pa. 2011) in which the Court again broadly interpreted the PCRA in
order to avoid a bifurcated system of reviewing ineffectiveness claims.
101. A.3d _(Pa. 2011).
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uled a hearing, the prosecution subpoenaed the psychologist to testify. The prose-
cution also asked Harris to waive the psychologist-client privilege with respect to
the psychologist's testimony. When Harris refused, the PCRA court granted the
prosecution's motion to declare the privilege waived and permitted the prosecutor
to hire the psychologist as its expert for the PCRA hearing.
The Supreme Court held that the PCRA court's order rejecting a claim of privi-
lege and requiring disclosures was immediately appealable.102 On the merits, the
Court held that the PCRA court correctly concluded that by challenging the perfor-
mance of both the psychologist and trial counsel, Harris waived "any privilege to
material necessary for the prosecution to refute those challenges."As to whether the
prosecution could retain and consult with the psychologist, the Court concluded
that the PCRA court had abused its discretion. The Court stated that permitting the
prosecution to employ the psychologist would risk disclosure of information to
which Harris has not waived the psychologist-client privilege. In addition, permit-
ting the prosecution to hire the psychologist would, in the Court's view,"erode pub-
lic confidence in the integrity of criminal proceedings."The prosecution is free, the
Court noted, to subpoena the psychologist to testify as a fact witness to the extent
any privilege has been waived as determined by the PCRA court on remand.
SERIAL PCRA PETITIONS AND PENDING FEDERAL
HABEAS LITIGATION
In Commonwealth v. Porter,103 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed the PCRA
court's decision to dismiss without a hearing a serial petition raising a Brady claim
as untimely while holding in abeyance a previously filed petition in which the de-
fendant challenged his death sentence under Atkins v. Virginia.104 Porter's conviction
and capital sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court. After the Court affirmed the denial of PCRA relief, Porter filed a federal
habeas corpus petition. While the federal proceeding was pending, Porter filed a
second PCRA petition raising an Atkins claim. Before the Atkins claim was heard, the
federal court dismissed Porter's guilt phase claims but granted Porter sentencing re-
lief based on an instructional error. After both parties cross-appealed in the federal
case, the PCRA court deferred consideration of Porter's Atkins claim. Thereafter,
Porter filed a supplement and amendment to his Atkins PCRA raising a Brady claim.
Porter then requested that the Third Circuit defer consideration of the cross-appeals
pending the PCRA court's resolution of his Brady claim. The PCRA court concluded
the Brady claim was not an amendment to the Atkins PCRA but an untimely third
petition and dismissed it without a hearing.
In holding that the PCRA court properly dismissed the Brady petition, the Court
rejected Porter's argument that there was a single serial petition in the PCRA court
raising initially the Atkins claim and then, by amendment to that petition, a Brady
claim. The Court held that the Brady claim was a separate petition because Porter
never requested or obtained approval from the PCRA court to amend his Atkins pe-
tition.105 The Court concluded that neither the PCRA or decisional law prevented
102. The court declined to follow the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Mohawk Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S.Ct. 599 (2009) refusing to allow such appeals in federal court proceedings.
103. __A.3d - (Pa.. 2012).
104. 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that it is unconstitutional to execute a mentally retarded person).
105. Pa.R.Crim.P. 905(A).
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the PCRA court from ruling on the Brady petition while continuing to hold the
Atkins petition in abeyance. Even though the Brady petition was filed within 60 days
of when the witness gave a statement recanting his trial testimony, the Court held
that the PCRA court correctly concluded that the petition was not timely because
Porter failed to explain why the information from the witness could not have been
discovered earlier.
With respect to the Atkins claim pending in the PCRA court, the Court stated that
there was "no reason why federal habeas petitions and serial state collateral peti-
tions cannot proceed simultaneously." Under the facts of this case, the Court held
that there was no reason for the PCRA court to defer resolution of the Atkins claim.
The Court directed the PCRA court to address the Atkins petition immediately and
cautioned PCRA courts generally not to postpone resolution of serial PCRA peti-
tions "merely to allow for federal habeas litigation of prior, exhausted claims."
